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I. What is not in Dispute. 
With no response by Respondent by the only Attorney who might have 
standing in the above entitled case, Mr. Pierson, is silent by the record. Then, the 
first interloper on the case, Mr. O'Neill of O'Neill Law Firm trespasses on the case 
with acknowledged approval of two (2) District Court Judges. 
It is a fact that Mr. O'Neill is not of the Law firm of Routh, Crabtree and 
Olson. It is a fact that Routh, Crabtree and Olson is not an Idaho Law Firm, nor 
ar'e they registered with the Bar of this state. It is also a fact that Mr. O'Neill serves 
as the registered agent for Routh, Crabtree and Olson to exclusively accept service 
of process for them in this state. Appellant believes that a fraud upon the Court has 
been committed by Mr. O'Neill concerning his affiliation with Routh, Crabtree, 
and Olson, who has no standing in any Court in this State. 
Over the objection of the Appellant, One judge who had no approval by 
Order of this Court to act as required by law to act in this case and the other, the 
assigned presiding judge, seemingly by the record did not want to perform his 
duties as required by law. Appellant use of the term "law" is as defined in the Code 
of Judicial Conduct. 
All decisions made were devoid of being in compliance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 (b) and case law decisions by this Court on the 
subject matter of attorney substitution all requiring strict compliance with the 
Rules of Court. Such determinations were not acts of discretion and were 
erroneous upon its face in defiance with the rule of law in this state. 
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Further such acts were prejudicial and detrimental to the Appellant and in 
violation of Sections 1 and 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
and the due process and equal protections clauses of the Constitution of the United 
States of America. 
Now it seems that Mr. O'Neill has enticed his fledgling, Mr. Langford, to 
continue in his stead without substitution being properly done either in accordance 
with Rule ll(b) of the I.R.C.P. and the Appellant objects to Mr. Langford tal<lng 
any action in the above entitled case without proper substitution being in place. All 
of these acts and actions demonstrates the Appellant's veracity concerning the fact 
Appellant was not properly noticed in the first attempted substitution is more 
probable than a lawful and proper substitution of counsel occurred in this case. 
Appellant now asks this Court to properly strike all filings of Mr. Langford 
sua sponte and to grant the relief in the pending Motion to Augment. 
These facts as stated in the Statement of the Case in Appellant's Opening 
Brief as well as the argument therein are not in dispute and are acquiesced by 
Respondent's silence on the record concerning all issues on appeal including costs 
on appeal and also the challenge to the constitutionality of the Non-judicial 
Foreclosure Act in chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code. 
Appellant objects to Mr. Langford's Brief for lack of standing without 
IRCP Rule l l(B) procedures for substitution of counsel having being met and Mr. 
O'Neill does not have standing for the same reason. 
Therefore, Langford's brief should be struck sua sponte. 
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II. Notice was NOT Served Upon Appellant as Required 
Under chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act 
But the most important point not addressed by Respondent and asserted by 
the Appellant throughout these proceedings was that Appellant did not get service 
of notice of the sale and for that matter most of the requirements of due process 
under chapter 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act. This Court has 
determined in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 
P.3d 429 (Idaho 2006)1, that strict compliance with notice provisions is required in 
foreclosure of Deeds of trusts citing Security Pacific Finance Corp v. Bishop, 109 
Idaho 25 at 28, 704 P.2d 357 at 360 (Idaho.App. 1985) in Note 1 of Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 at 143 Idaho 
46, 137 P.3d 433 (Idaho 2006). 
Further this Court has previously rejected the argument brought by Mr. 
O'Neill, even if he has standing, that even if Appellant did not receive the proper 
statutory requirements of notice under 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure 
Act that the sale is final under the provisions of LC. §§ 45-1508 and 45-1510. By 
raising this issue the Respondent admitted that they knew of the notice 
requirements in other provisions of 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act. 
See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 at 
I That this case cite is the same cite as Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 
Fannie Mae, v. Gary R. and Linda L. Appel, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 
31760, 2006 Opinion No. 61, in the Opening Brief by Appellant. It should also 
be noted that Bonner County is the only county in this State which does nqt 
allow litigants access of law library materials. 
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143 Idaho 46-7, 137 P.3d 433-4 (Idaho 2006). 
Mr. O'Neill clearly admitted at the April 2l51· 2011 hearing that the notice 
requirements were not met. See Transcript of the Hearing of April 21st, 2011 and 
is incorporated herein by its reference. In Appellant's Opening Brief Appellant the 
specific conversation that Judge Verby and Mr. O'Neill had pertaining to the lack 
of notice Appellant did not receive as required by 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial 
Foreclosure Act. 
It was a lack of discretion by Judge Verby after learning of the lack of 
notice to Appellant and that Appellant did not receive notice as required under 15 
of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act coupled with Appellant giving Judge 
Verby notice of this Court's recent opinion of Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Cmp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 PJd 429 (Idaho 2006) in providing adequate 
protections to Appellant's rights in property under Section 1 and 18 of Article 1 of 
the Constitution of the State of Idaho and the due process clauses under the State 
and National Constitutions. 
III. Real Party in Interest. 
It is pointed out in the case of Security Pacific Finance Corp v. Bishop, I 09 
Idaho 25 at 28, 704 P.2d 357 at 360 (Idaho.App. 1985) that "lenders must strictly 
comply with the Deed of Trust statutes, and the statutes and Deed of Trust must be 
strictly construed in favor of of the borrower." citing Patton v. First Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473,578 P.2d 152, 156 (1978). See 
Note 1 in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 PJd 
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429 (Idaho 2006). 
Recently across this nation courts are rejecting the notion that MERS can 
act as beneficiary and nominee at the same time, because MERS admits that they 
are nothing more than a national electronic registration and tracking system that 
tracks the beneficial ownership interests and serving rights in mortgage loans. See 
addendum 1 In re Mitchell, Memorandum Opinion from the United States 
Bankruptcy Court District of Nevada on March 31st, 2009 and is incorporated 
herein by its reference. 
Appellant requests this Court to TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE of addendum 
1 - In re Mitchell, Memorandum Opinion from the United States Bankruptcy 
Court District of Nevada on March 31st, 2009. 
Appellant tried to explain to Judges Hosack and Yerby that MERS could 
not pass beneficial interests to SunTrust Mortgage, which started the chain of lack 
of standing to the Respondent. 
Coupled with the fact that the original promissory note had been already 
sold in the open market by Panhandle State Bank, the loan originator, MERS did 
not have possession of the Original Wet Ink Promissory Note, nor could each 
alleged successor in interest have a complete instrument to each subsequent 
supposed purchaser of the promissory note and Deed of Trust. See addendum 1 -
In re Mitchell, Memorandum Opinion from the United States Bankruptcy Court 
District of Nevada on March 31st, 2009 page 8 which states to wit: 
"For there to be a valid assignment for purposes of foreclosure both 
Page 5 of 11 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
the note and deed of trust must be assigned. A mortgage loan 
consists of a promissory note and a security instrument, typically a 
mortgage or a deed of trust. When the note is split from the deed of 
trust, 'the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.' 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.4 
99 cmt. a (1997). A person holding only a note lacks power to 
foreclose because it lacks the security, and a person holding only a 
deed of trust suffers no default because only the holder of the note 
is entitled to payment on it. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.4 99 cmt. e (1997). 'Where the 
mortgage has 'transferred' only the mortgage the transaction is a 
nullity and his 'assignee,' having received no interest in the 
underlying debt or obligation, has a worthless piece of paper.' 4 
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PRPERTY, § 
37.27[2] (2000)." 
Also, constructive fraud and or fraud in the factum from the inception is 
also alleged by the Appellant, which Appellant has never been given an 
opportunity to present his case-in-chief, which is part of his meritorious defenses 
in answer to Plaintiffs complaint. 
In this case Sun Trust Mortgage purchased an incomplete instrument from 
Panhandle State Bank or MERS, who could not pass title due to their lack of 
standing to convey, sell, or otherwise transfer title in the first instance and 
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secondly with the lack of the complete instrument comprising of the original 
promissory note and Deed of Trust being kept together. 
Where real party-in-interest status has been made mandatory by statute or 
rule, as it has in Idaho, real-party-in-interest status must be demonstrated before a 
suit can proceed. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254 at 258, 
230 P.3d 1073 at 1077 (Idaho 2009), which was another meritorious defense raised 
in answer to Plaintiffs complaint, as well as raised orally at each hearing. See 
transcripts of March 171\ 2011, pages 26 - 28, April 21 si, 2011 pages 8 - 11 and 16 
-22, and 24 27, July 21st, 2011 pages 6 - 8. 
All these meritorious defenses raised in answer to Plaintiffs complaint and 
under the doctrine of standing required the Court to decide the standing issue 
before moving forward which was not done at each stage of the case. This was not 
a discretionary act, it is required under rule of law and in error was not done. 
Respondent having not alleged or demonstrated having the original wet-ink 
promissory note gives Respondent no standing in this case to foreclose on the 
property owned by the Appellant. This is also true for Suntrust Mortgage, Just 
Law, Inc., MERS or Panhandle State Bank. Appellant asserted to the trial court for 
Respondent to produce the original wet-ink promissory note and the court failed to 
order the Respondent to produce the original wet-ink promissory note to prove 
standing and was a denial of due process and was an abuse of discretion in 
violation of IRCP Rule 17(a) which requires a cause to be brought in the name of 
the real party-in-interest. 
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Any purported deed issued by and/or for Suntrust Mortgage is a forged and 
or fraudulent deed for the reasons as stated above and if they should provide it to 
the court would also be a fraud upon the court. 
Any purported deed issued deed to Respondent, which is nothing more 
than a deed to Suntrust Mortgage is another forged and or fraudulent deed for the 
reasons as stated above, as well as, it was a deed which actually purports to deed 
title to the Respondent but uses Suntrust's address, and if they should provide it to 
the court would also be a fraud upon the court. 
Any purported deed issued by and for Suntruat Mortgage was done in 
derogation to 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act as Appellant 
emphasizes once again was not provided notice as required under 15 of Title 
45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act and as such all deeds issued after Appellant's 
Deed are null and void. See addendum 1 - In re Mitchell, Memorandum Opinion 
from the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Nevada on March 31 si, 2009. 
Based upon the record it is clearly, palpably and inherently false that 
Respondent is the "real-party-in-interest" in the above entitled case, unless they 
can demonstrate that they have possession of the original wet-ink promissory note 
and deed of trust. Notices of Demand were sent to each lending institution and 
requests were made to Just Law, Inc., and the Respondent to produce the original 
wet-ink promissory note to prove that they were the holder in due course and each 
party failed to do so and by their acquiescence of silence to even respond. 
Respondent does not have the original wet-ink promissory note and therefore has 
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no standing. 
IV. Constitutionality of 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act 
If not for any other reason and as demonstrated across the nation many 
people being foreclosed such as in the case of the Appellant under chapter 15 of 
Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act is unconstitutional because the act failed to 
provide adequate protection to the Appellant and others in the same position as 
Appellant from unscrupulous supposed lenders and banking institutions. 
V. Conclusion 
Mr. Pierson was the originator of the Complaint, who after receiving 
Notice of facts surrounding the loan with Panhandle State Bank who sold altered 
documents from its original state to Suntrust Mortgage, Mr. Pierson wanted out of 
the case. Without properly following the mandatory procedures in the rule on 
withdrawing counsel, in which only the Appellant has actual knowledge of facts 
did not receive a Notice signed by both Mr. Pierson and Mr. O'Neill. This Court 
has stated over-and-over that strict complaince is required. Again, we see non-
compliance with this rule by Mr. O'Neill by his attempt to substitute himself with 
Mr. Langford a junior in his law firm without proper notice of substitution of 
counsel signed by both attorneys. Law firms are not members of the bar or 
attorneys and absent a General Power of Attorney from the Respondent has no 
standing in the above entitled case. 
Looking at the record and the actual document mentioned in Respondnet's 
complaint, Many of them were deficient to comply with the Non-judicial 
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Foreclosure Act in 45-1506, 45-1506A or Band in fact as admitted by Mr. O'Neill 
Appellant did not get served with Notice of Sale prior to the sale, which was done 
outside Bonner County, State of Idaho - another violation of the Act. 
Other reasons more ominious shows that everybody whose deed is after the 
Appellant does not pass title in accordance with the law of the land. Thus being 
the case, Respondent, who is really Suntrust Mortgage does not have standing 
either. 
At a critical strage of the proceeding on the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, 
to be heard in February then being forced into a new hearing date without Notice 
and without authority. Then without Notice and without authority another judge 
who was not assigned to the case appears and determines the Motion without 
standing to do so, leaving the Motion undetermined. 
No Adversary, No Counsel, No Judge - and the law, thus far seems to be 
non-existant at this point. Judge Yerby decides to finally do the case he was 
assigned to and makes multiple procedure errors which affected the outcome of 
the case to the Appellant's detriment and prejudice, even though the law was 
provided and explained. 
Appellant asserts that this Court should reverse adverse decisions made and 
the Appellant, accepts your promissory oath and the oaths of all of the officers of 
this court. The court is now open. 
Dated: October 7th, 2011 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
David Bruce Allen, In Properfa 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERIFY that on this 7th day of October, 2011, I lodged for 
filing the original bound reply brief, six ( 6) true and correct bound copies, and one 
true and correct unbound, unstapled copy of the foregoing Reply Appellate Brief 
with the Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that on the same date, I caused two (2) each true 
and correct bound copies of the foregoing Reply Appellate Brief to be served to 
each as follows: 
Mark D. Pierson 
MARK D. PIERSON, P.A. 
314 South 9th Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 6575 
Boise, near [83707-6575] 
State of Idaho 
Courtesy Copies: 
Mr. Derrick J. O'Neill and Brian R. Langford 
O'Neill Law, PLLC 
300 Main Street, Suite 150 
Boise, near [83702] 
State of Idaho 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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16 
In re 
Entered on Docket 
March 31, 2009 
Hon. Linda B. Riegle 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEV ADA 
****** 
Case No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR 
Chapter 7 
JOSHUA & STEPHANIE MITCHELL, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Debtor(s). ) 
~ DATE: August 19, 2008 TIME: 3:30 p.m. 
____________ ) 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Mortgage Electronic Recording Systems, Inc. ("MERS") through various counsel has 
17 filed a number of motions to lift stay. 1 Some of the motions were filed in the name of NIERS, 
18 while others have been filed in the name of MERS as the nominee for another entity. An order 
19 for joint briefing was entered because the substantially same issues were presented in the 
20 motions, and a joint hearing was held. Mitchell (#07-16226) has been designated as the lead 
21 case.2 The trustee or counsel for the debtor in these cases has opposed the lift-stay motions on the 
22 
23 1Motions have been filed in the following cases: #07-16226, #07-016333, #07-16645, 
24 #07-17577,#07-18851,#08-10427,08-11007,#08-11860,#07-13593,#08-10108,#08-10778, 
#08-12255,#07-17468,#08-11245,#08-11608,#08-11668,#08-11725,#08-11819,#08-12206, 
25 #08-12242, #08-12317, #08-12319, #08-10052, #08-10072, #08-10718, #08-11499, #07-16519. 
26 
Each of the judges will enter their own orders in the matters that are assigned to them. 
27 
2The docket numbers mentioned in this opinion are to the Mitchell case unless otherwise 
28 noted. 
1 
1 grounds of standing and that MERS is not the real party in interest. 
2 The initial response filed by MERS contained no evidentiary support. Rather it described 
3 the role of MERS and its members by relying on law review articles and the recitation of facts in 
4 other cases in other districts involving MERS. Prior to the initial argument, MERS attempted to 
5 withdraw the motions filed in all but four of the cases. MERS then filed a declaration at the 
6 court's direction explaining why the motions were withdrawn. The declaration of William 
7 Hultman was filed in Dart.3 The declaration, in addition to explaining MERS' rationale for 
8 withdrawing the motions, also attached as exhibits copies of the MERS Membership 
9 Application, the MERSCorp. Inc. Rules of Membership, the MERS Procedural Manual, and the 
10 MERS Terms and Conditions ofMembership.4 The court also requested appropriate evidentiary 
11 support for the allegations concerning the relationship between MERS and the entities for whom 
12 the motions were brought. A supplemental declaration was filed in Michell, the lead case.5 
13 As noted, MERS has attempted to withdraw all but four of its original motions, leaving 
14 only Dart (#08-11007), Hawkins (#07-13593), Ramirez-Furiati (#08-10427), and Zeigler (#08-
15 10718). MERS admits that it failed to follow its own procedures in the motions it wants to 
16 withdraw.6 The debtor, the chapter 13 trustee, and MERS subsequently stipulated to a lift of stay 
17 in Ramirez-Furiati which the court approved with the acknowledgment that the order contained 
18 no finding about MERS' standing. 7 This court will discuss the issues raised in the motions that 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
3 Dart (#08-11007). 
4Docket #4 7 in Dart. 
5Docket #74 in Mitchell ("Huntman Declaration"). The Declaration also incorporated the 
prior declaration filed by Mr. Hultman in Dart. References in this memorandum to the 
declaration filed in Mitchell include the incorporated declaration and the exhibits thereto. 
6Docket #74, Declaration of William Hultman ("Hultman Declaration"), Exhibit 1, pp. 4-
5. "The fact that MERS chose to not go forward on these ... motions was not a determination by 
MERS that it does not have standing to move for relief from stay." Exhibit D to that Declaration 
sets forth the name of the motions withdrawn and the reason for withdrawal. 
7Docket #54 in #08-10427. 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
MERS attempts to withdraw,8 and by this order issues its ruling in Dart and Hawkins, which are 
the two cases that are now pending before it.9 
The court has advised the parties that it would consider any information contained on the 
MERS website at http://www.mersinc.org/ unless an objection was made. No objection has been 
filed by either party. The court thus takes judicial notice of the contents of the MERS website. 
WHAT IS MERS? 
MERS is a national electronic registration and tracking system that tracks the 
beneficial ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans. 10 The MERS website says 
this: 
MERS is an innovative process that simplifies the 
way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are 
originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real 
estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need 
to prepare and record assignments when trading 
residential and commercial mortgage loans. 
William Hultman, Secretary ofMERS, has testified in his Declaration that loans are 
registered to a "MERS Member" who has entered into the MERS Membership Agreement. 
MERS Members enter into a contract with MERSCORP to electronically register and track 
beneficial ownership interests and servicing rights in MERS registered mortgage loans. 11 MERS 
Members agree to appoint MERS, which MERSCORP wholly owns, to act as their common 
agent, or nominee, and to name MERS as the lienholder of record in a nominee capacity on all 
8FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 makes FED. R. BANKR. P. 7041 applicable to contested matters, 
which includes lift stay motions, and FED. R. BANKR. P. 7041 incorporates FED. R. Crv. P. 41. 
Under these rules, a party can voluntarily dismiss a lift-stay motion without a court order only if 
there is a stipulation to dismiss or the dismissal is filed before an opposition is filed, and neither 
is true here. 
9Some cases were added to the argument calendar after the April 29, 2008 joint hearing 
order. Separate orders will be entered in each of those cases, which counsel agreed to continue 
pending a ruling in the "test case." See Transcript (Docket# 83) pp. 9 and 76. 
10MERS Response, Docket# 49, p. 3. 
1 i.'MERS Members" are mortgage lenders and other entities. ("Membership in MERS 
Overview," filed with Hultman Declaration, Docket #74.) 
3 
1 recorded security instruments relating to the loans registered on the MERS System. \\Then a 
2 promissory note is sold by the original lender to others, the various sales of the notes are tracked 
3 on the MERS System. 12 
4 Hultman goes on to say in his Declaration that once MERS becomes the beneficiary of 
5 record as nominee, it remains the beneficiary when the beneficial ownership interests in the 
6 promissory note or servicing rights are transferred by one MERS Member to another and that it 
7 tracks the transfers electronically on the MERS System. So long as the sale of the note involves a 
8 member of:VIERS, °YIERS remains the beneficiary of record on the deed of trust and continues to 
9 act as nominee for the new beneficial owner. 13 
IO STANDING 
11 MERS must have both constitutional and prudential standing,14 and be the real party in 
12 interest under FED. R. CIV. P. 17,15 in order to be entitled to lift-stay relief. 
13 Constitutional standing under Article III requires, at a minimum, that a party must have 
14 suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's conduct, that the injury be 
15 traced to the challenged action, and that it is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Valley 
16 Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464,472 
1 7 (1982)( citations and internal quotations omitted). 
18 Beyond the Article III requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressibility, MERS 
19 must also have prudential standing, which is judicially-created set of principles that places limits 
20 on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' powers. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
21 
22 
23 
24 
12Docket #74, Hultman Declaration at ,r 3. 
13Docket # 74, Hultman Declaration at~ 4. 
14The standing doctrine "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court 
25 jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128-29 
(2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975)). 
26 
27 
15Stay-reliefrequests are governed by FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a)(l), to which FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 9014 is applicable. Rule 9014, in turn, incorporates Rule 7017, which makes FED. R. 
28 CIV. P. 17 applicable ("[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."). 
4 
1 499 (1975). As a prudential matter, a plaintiff must assert "his own legal interests as the real 
2 party in interest," Dunmore v. United States, 358 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9 th Cir. 2004), as found in 
3 FED. R. Crv. P. 17, which provides "[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party 
4 in interest." 
5 MERS' primary contention is that it has standing by virtue of the fact that it was 
6 named as the beneficiary under the deeds of trust and that the trustor ( the maker of the note) 
7 recognized MERS could take actions of the beneficiary or that it is the nominee of the 
8 beneficiary. "In non-judicial foreclosure states, [MERS] must at least be the record beneficiary 
9 under the Deed of Trust, with the powers expressly set forth therein, including the power of 
10 foreclosure; in addition, as noted, it may become the holder on the note under some 
11 circumstances. This procedure fully establishes standing under this court's rules and Nevada 
12 law."16 MERS argues in its supplemental brief: "It would be reasonable to hold that a motion that 
13 pleads MERS is the of-record beneficiary on the deed of trust is prima facie evidence of standing 
14 to move for relief from stay and contains an implied certification that MERS is able to discharge 
15 the responsibilities of a movant."17 MERS states that the issue of standing focuses on who can 
16 foreclose and that MERS can foreclose on the properties as a "person authorized to make the sale 
17 under the terms of the trust deed. 18 (See also, Transcript, Docket# 83, pp. 14-15.) 
18 MERS also argues that it has standing which follows principles set forth in the Uniform 
19 Commercial Code that entitle a nominee holder of an instrument to sue to enforce the 
20 instrument. 19 It is unclear whether MERS is arguing that it has standing in its own right, or as the 
21 agent of the entity entitled to enforce the note, or both. Compare the following arguments, all 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
16MERS' Response, Docket #49, p. 9 (emphasis added). 
17 Supplemental Brief of MERS, Docket# 73, p. 10. 
18Docket #49, p. 10. However, it is not the beneficiary that is authorized to make the sale 
under the trust deed, it is the trustee. 
19Docket #49, p. 10. 
5 
1 made in the same supplemental brief.20 MERS argues at page 9 of the brief that "this evidence 
2 demonstrates MERS right to enforce the note as the note's 'holder."'21 In the same brief, at page 
3 8, it argues "[t]his evidence further demonstrates MERS authority to act/or the current beneficial 
4 mvner of the loan or its servicer."22 And at page 1 of the brief MERS argues this: "In the motions 
5 at issue, MERS is the agent of the original lender and its successors and assigns for defined 
6 purposes (such a relationship is termed a 'nominee.')."23 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
STANDING AS THE NAMED BENEFICIARY OR 
THE NOMINEE OF THE BENEFICIARY OR ITS ASSIGNEE 
:WIERS does not have standing merely because it is the alleged beneficiary under the 
deed of trust. It is not a beneficiary and, in any event, the mere fact that an entity is a named 
beneficiary of a deed of trust is insufficient to enforce the obligation. 
The deed of trust attempts to name MERS as both a beneficiary and a nominee. The 
document first says this: 
(E). 
MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee 
for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is the 
beneficiary under this Security Instrurnent.24 
And later it says this: 
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS ( solely as 
nominee for Lender and Lenders successors and assigns) and the 
successors and assigns of MERS.25 
20Docket #73. 
21Docket #73, p. 9. 
22Docket # 73, p. 8. (Emphasis added.) 
23Docket #73, p. 1. 
241n re Mitchell, #07-16226, Motion to Lift Stay (Docket# 30), Exhibit B, p. 2, Subpart 
25 In re Mitchell, #07-16226, Motion to Lift Stay (Docket# 30), Exhibit B, p. 3. 
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MERS' "Terms and Conditions"26 identifies MERS' interests. The Terms and Conditions 
say this: 
MERS shall serve as mortgagee of record with respect to all such 
mortgage loans solely as a nominee, in an administrative 
capacity, for the beneficial owner or owners thereof from time to 
time. MERS shall have no rights whatsoever to any payments 
made on account of such mortgage loans, to any servicing rights 
related to such mortgage loans, or to any mortgaged properties 
securing such mortgage loans. MERS agrees not to assert any 
rights ( other than rights specified in the Governing Documents) 
with respect to such mortgage loans or mortgaged properties. 
References herein to "mortgage(s)" and "mortgagee ofrecord" 
shall include deed(s) of trust and beneficiary under a deed of trust 
and any other form of security instrument under applicable state 
law. 
(Emphasis added.) 
A "beneficiary" is defined as "one designated to benefit from an appointment, 
disposition, or assignment ... or to receive something as a result of a legal arrangement or 
instrument." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (8th ed. 2004). But it is obvious from the MERS' 
"Terms and Conditions" that MERS is not a beneficiary as it has no rights whatsoever to any 
payments, to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties secured by the loans. To reverse an 
old adage, if it doesn't walk like a duck, talk like a duck, and quack like a duck, then it's not a 
duck.27 
But more importantly, even if MERS is the nominee of the beneficiary, or the motion was 
brought by the beneficiary, that mere allegation is not sufficient to confer standing. 
Under Nevada law a negotiable promissory note28 is enforceable by: (1) the holder9 of the 
26
"MERS Terms and Conditions" filed in Dart (#08-11007) at ,r 2, Docket #47-7. 
(Emphasis added.) 
27The court is aware of at least one case in this district, Elias v. Homeeq Serv., 2009 WL 
481270 (D. Nev. 2009)(slip copy), in which MERS has been found to have standing to foreclose 
as a nominee beneficiary of a deed of trust. While the court in Elias found the deeds of trust, 
notices of foreclosure, and the trustee's deed upon sale established MERS' standing, there is 
nothing in the opinion to suggest that MERS lacked possession of the notes. 
28The court assumes, without deciding, that the notes in question are negotiable 
instruments. If they aren't, then custom and practice will treat them as if they are. For example, 
7 
1 note, or (2) a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder.30 Thus if MERS 
2 is not the holder of the note, then to enforce it MERS must be a transferee in possession who is 
3 entitled to the rights of a holder or have authority under state law to act for the holder. Simply 
4 being a beneficiary or having an assignment of a deed of trust is not enough to be entitled to 
5 foreclose on a deed of trust. For there to be a valid assignment for purposes of foreclosure both 
6 the note and the deed of trust must be assigned. A mortgage loan consists of a promissory note 
7 and a security instrument, typically a mortgage or a deed of trust.31 When the note is split from 
8 the deed of trust, "the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
9 PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.4 cmt. a (1997). A person holding only a note lacks the power to 
10 foreclose because it lacks the security, and a person holding only a deed of trust suffers no 
11 default because only the holder of the note is entitled to payment on it. See RESTATEMENT 
12 (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.4 cmt. e (1997). "Where the mortgagee has 
13 'transferred' only the mortgage, the transaction is a nullity and his 'assignee,' having received no 
14 interest in the underlying debt or obligation, has a worthless piece of paper." 4 RICHARD R. 
15 POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY,§ 37.27[2] (2000). 
16 Given this, it is troubling that MERS apparently believes that in states such as Nevada 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
under N.R.S. § 104.9012(tt), Nevada's Article 9, an "instrument" is defined as a negotiable 
instrument, "or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary 
obligation ... and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with 
any necessary endorsement or assignment." "Instruments" are thus defined somewhat broadly 
according to ordinary business practices. 
29 A "holder" is the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either 
to a bearer or to an identified person who has possession. N.R.S. § 104.1201 (u) 
30N.R.S. § 104.3301. A negotiable promissory is also enforceable under N.R.S. 
§ 104.3301 ( c) by a nonholder of a note that has been stolen, destroyed, or paid by mistake. There 
has been no allegation in this case making this provision relevant here. 
31Nevada recognizes that parties may secure the performance of an obligation or the 
payment of a debt by means of a deed of trust. N.R.S. § 107.020. The maker of the note is the 
trustor and the payee is the beneficiary. 
8 
1 possession of the note is not required if no deficiency is sought. 32 Hultman says this in his 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
declaration: 
In non-judicial foreclosure states, if the Member chooses to have 
MERS foreclose under the power of sale provision in the security 
instrument and is not seeking a deficiency judgment, then the note 
does not need to be in the possession of the Member's MERS 
Certifying Officer when commencing the foreclosure action; 
provided, however, that under no circumstances may the Member 
allege that the note is in MERS possession and seek enforcement 
of the note unless MERS actually possesses the note.33 
This distinction between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states, or deficiency and 
non-deficiency ones, is one which MERS has designed out of whole cloth. In order to foreclose, 
MERS must establish there has been a sufficient transfer of both the note and deed of trust, or 
that it has authority under state law to act for the note's holder. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.4 cmt. c (1997). See also, In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516-17 
(Bankr. C.D. Calif. 2008). 
DOES MERS HA VE STANDING AS THE AGENT OF 
14 THE MEMBER OR IN ITS OWN RIGHT? 
15 The mere statement that the movant is a member of MERS does nothing but lay the 
16 groundwork for agency. In order to enforce rights as the agent of the holder, MERS must 
1 7 establish that its principal is entitled to enforce the note. Motions brought by MERS as nominee 
18 could meet the threshold test of standing, and MERS might be the "real party in interest" under 
19 FED. R. Crv. P. 1 7, if MERS is the actual nominee of the present Member who is entitled to 
20 enforce the note. Under Rule 17 a party in interest is any party to whom the relevant substantive 
21 law grants a cause of action. U-Haul Int'!, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 
22 1986). Counsel for MERS acknowledged during oral argument that MERS is the agent for its 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
32Despite MERS' contention that the mere status as a beneficiary or nominee of a 
beneficiary is sufficient, MERS has tried to withdraw most of its motions because it could not 
ascertain that its Member had possession of the note when the motion was filed. See Hultman 
Declaration at p. 4, Docket #74; Docket #49 at p.11; and Docket #47, Exhibit Din Dart). 
33Hultman Declaration, Docket #74, ,r 4. 
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members only.34 If a note has been transferred to a non-member, then MERS cannot act as the 
agent. One cannot assume that just because MERS was named as the initial nominee in the deed 
of trust that it still retains that relationship with the holder of the note. Moreover, by virtue of the 
fact that some of the motions were filed even after the note was transferred out of the MERS 
system, it is apparent that MERS has not tracked ( or been appropriately advised of) the 
assignment of the note to a non-member. For example in Moore,35 MERS brought a motion to 
lift-stay in February 2008 as nominee for Quick Loan Funding.36 Later, in July 2008, an amended 
lift-stay motion was brought by GRP Loan in Moore. 37 Exhibit C to the amended motion shows 
that an assignment of the deed of trust was made from MERS to GRP on February 27, 2007, 
which pre-dates MERS' lift-stay motion.38 Similarly, in Mercado, 39 a matter which was added to 
the argument calendar after the order for joint briefing,40 MERS brought a motion to lift-stay as 
nominee for MILA.41 However, as seen in a later stipulation to sell the property,42 Homecomings 
Financial Network was the entity who was entitled to enforce the note. 
In the remaining cases, MERS has attempted to establish its standing through the 
affidavits of "Certifying Officials." Under the Membership Agreement, MERS provides 
Members a corporate resolution designating one or more employees of the Member a MERS 
Certifying Officer. This resolution, among other things, appoints the individual as an assistant 
34See also, Docket #74, Hultman Declaration at ,r 4. 
35 Moore (#07-16333). 
36Docket #37 in Moore. 
37Docket #59 in Moore. 
38Docket #59, Exhibit C. 
39#07-17690. 
40Docket #44 in Mercado. 
41Docket #28 in Mercado. 
42Docket # 50, Exhibit 1 in Mercado. 
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1 secretary and vice president ofMERS. They are given the power to "take any and all actions and 
2 execute all documents necessary to protect the interest of the Member, the beneficial owner of 
3 such mortgage loan, or MERS in any bankruptcy proceeding regarding a loan registered on the 
4 MERS System that is shown to be registered to the Member.43 There appears to be absolutely no 
5 requirement that these Certifying Officers have any knowledge of the loan in question. From the 
6 MERS website it appears that the "Certifying Official" (the person who works for the holder of 
7 the note) is not an employee of the servicer either.44 
8 In Hawkins the motion was brought by MERS "solely as nominee for Fremont Investment 
9 & Loan, its successors and/or assigns."45 However, in his affidavit at~ 6, Victor Parisi46 states 
10 that the beneficial ownership interest in the Hawkins note was sold by Fremont Investment & 
11 Loan and ownership was transferred by endorsement and delivery. While the affidavit goes on to 
12 the say that MERS was a holder at the time the motion was filed, it is obvious that MERS has no 
13 rights to bring the motion as nominee of Fremont given that Fremont no longer had any interest 
14 in the note. 
15 Similarly, in Ziegler47 the motion was brought by MERS "solely as nominee for Meridias 
16 Capital, Inc., its successors and/or assigns."48 Yet the affidavit of Stacey Kranz at~ 6 states that 
17 "the beneficial ownership interest in the Zeigler Note was sold by Meridias and ownership was 
18 transferred by endorsement and delivery. The Zeigler Note was subsequently endorsed in 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
43Form Corporate Resolution, attached to Exhibit C to the Hultman Declaration, filed in 
Dart, #08-11007. 
44The website says that "[a]fter your mortgage loan closed, your lender more than likely 
outsourced the job of managing your loan to another company called a SERVICER. This is the 
company you call when you have questions about your loan." 
45Docket #28 in #07-13593. 
46Docket #49, Exhibit C, and Docket #56, Exhibit A in Mitchell. 
47#08-10718. 
48#08-10718, Docket #21. 
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blank."49 An additional affidavit was filed by German Florez, the president of Meridias, who 
disavowed "any interest in the Note and Deed of Trust regarding the Subject Property."50 
A slightly different defect exists Dart. That motion was brought by MERS "solely as 
nominee for Centralbanc Mortgage, its successors and/or assigns."51 However, Ms. Mech, as 
Certifying Officer, testifies that the note is held by Bank of America, who is listed as the current 
servicer, and who "had (or has) physical possession of the note in its files."52 In a previous 
affidavit, Ms. Mech testified that "the beneficial mvnership interest in the Dart Note was sold by 
Centralbanc and ownership was transferred by endorsement and delivery. The Dart 1\ote was 
subsequently endorsed in blank."53 
So while in each of these cases MERS may really be contending that is it entitled to 
enforce the note in its own right through possession, or as the nominee of the transferee, the 
motion was brought instead as nominee of an entity that no longer has any ownership interest in 
the note. 
Additionally, each motion has been brought in the name of the lender and "its successors 
and/or assigns." Under FED. R. Crv. P. 17 an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest. "As a general rule, a person who is an attorney-in-fact or an agent solely for the 
purpose of bringing suit is viewed as a nominal rather than a real party in interest and will be 
required to litigate in the name of his principal rather than in his own name." 6A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT &ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AKD PROCEDURE §1553 (2d ed. 1990). An 
agent with ownership interest in the subject matter of the suit is a real party in interest. Id. There 
is no evidence, however, of an agency relationship here or that MERS has any ownership interest 
49Docket #56, Exhibit C-1 in Mitchell. 
50Docket #56, Exhibit C-3 in Mitchell. 
51Docket #25 in Dart (#08-11007). 
52Docket #81-1 at~ 4 in }vfitchell. 
53Docket #49-1 at~ 6 in Mitchell. 
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making it the real party in interest under Rule 17. 
OTHER EVIDENCE PROBLE~S 
Even if the defects were ones of pure pleading,54 the testimony in these cases is neither 
competent nor admissible. Each of the affiants in the remaining cases testify as follows: 
I have been appointed as Assistant Secretary of Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems., Inc. ("MERS") under a 
Corporate Resolution that was executed on [date]. I make this 
affidavit in support of Movant I have reviewed the loan file 
relating to the above-referenced matter, and if called upon to testify 
as to the facts set forth in this Affidavit, I could and would testify 
competently based upon my review. 
The affiant then purports to set forth the history of the negotiation and transfer of the note 
and who now has possession.55 
First, this testimony is not admissible because there is no evidence that the affiants are 
competent witnesses. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in bankruptcy56 yet there is no 
evidence that these Certifying Officers have adequate personal knowledge of the facts under FED. 
R. Evrn. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.").57 
54For example, Mr. Hultman has stated that a number of motions were withdrawn because 
they identified MERS as the payee under the note. Hultman Declaration, Docket #74 in Mitchell. 
55For example Ms. Mech testifies in her affidavit (Docket# 81-1) that at the time MERS 
filed the motion to lift stay in Dart: 
Bank or America, who is listed as the current servicer on the Dart 
(MIN: 100233602006080675) loan registered on the MERS System, 
had (and has) physical possession of the original notes in its files. 
MERS in turn has possession of those documents through a 
MERS Certifying Officer who is an employee of the member 
listed as servicer on the MERS System. 
56FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017. 
57Stacey Kranz, "an Assistant Secretary of [MERS] under a Corporate Resolution" 
testifies in Zeigler (#08-10718) that "MERS was in physical possession of the Zeigler Note at the 
time MERS filed the motion .... "(Docket #73 in Zeigler #08-10718). Mr. Victor Parsi, similarly 
appointed, testifies in Hmvkins that "MERS was a holder of the Hawkins Note at the time the 
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Ms. Mech's bald assertion that she has "reviewed the loan file" is inadequate to show that 
she is personally knowledgeable of the facts. Neither are the purported notes and deeds 
admissible. For business records to be admissible as an exception from the hearsay rule under 
FED. R. Evrn. 803(6) there must be a showing that the records were: 
(1) made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge; 
(2) made pursuant to a regular practice of the business activity; 
(3) kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity; and 
(4) the source, method, or circumstances of preparation must not indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
These elements must be established either by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness or must meet certification requirements. See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 
444 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
CONCLUSION 
The lift-stay motions in Dart and Hawkins are denied. MERS may not enforce the 
notes as the alleged beneficiary. While MERS may have standing to prosecute the motion in the 
name of its Member as a nominee, there is no evidence that the named nominee is entitled to 
enforce the note or that MERS is the agent of the note's holder. Indeed, the evidence is to the 
contrary, the note has been sold, and the named nominee no longer has any interest in the note. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
28 Motion for Relief was filed in MERS name .... "(Docket #56-2 filed in Mitchell.) 
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